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  We investigate the motives and consequences of the consolidation of banks in 
Japan during the period of fiscal year 1990-2004 using a comprehensive dataset. Our 
analysis suggests that the government’s too-big-to-fail policy played an important role in 
the mergers and acquisitions (M&As), though its attempt does not seem to have been 
successful. The efficiency-improving motive also seems to have driven the M&As 
conducted by major banks and regional banks in the post-crisis period, while the 
market-power motive seems to have driven the M&As conducted by regional banks and 
corporative (shinkin) banks. We obtain no evidence that supports managerial motives for 
empire  building.   
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Consolidation of Banks in Japan: Causes and Consequences 
 
1.  Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) among financial institutions have been 
accelerating over the last two decades across the world. These waves of mergers and 
acquisitions in the banking industries raise important questions of whether mergers 
enhance the efficiency of surviving banks and contribute to the stabilization of the 
banking sector or just increase their market power in setting prices. A large number of 
studies attempt to resolve these questions by examining profitability, cost efficiency and 
market performance of merger survivors. However, most of the existing studies examine 
the consolidation among the U.S. or European financial institutions and little is known 
about the causes and consequences of financial consolidation outside the U.S. or Europe. 
This paper investigates the causes and consequences of the consolidation among 
Japanese banks. In Japan, a variety of banks have been consolidated since the 1990s 
when most banks suffered from a huge amount of non-performing loans.   
The number of city banks, which operate nation-widely and internationally, remained at 
13 during the 1980s but decreased almost by half to 7 in 2005. While the number of 
first-tier regional banks, which operate in one or a few prefectures, virtually did not 
change over the last two decades (63 in 1980 and 64 in 2005), the number of second-tier 
regional banks, which are smaller than first-tier regional banks and operate mainly 
within a prefecture, decreased from 71 in 1980 to 48 in 2005. The number of cooperative   3
(shinkin) banks, which are deposit-taking cooperatives operating within a prefecture and 
specializing in small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) loans, also dropped from 462 
in 1980 to 301 in 2005
1.  
Using a rich dataset of bank M&As in Japan, this paper comprehensively analyzes 
the causes and consequences of bank mergers in the following ways. First, we analyze 
motives of bank mergers as well as their consequences. Using ex-ante bank 
characteristics, we investigate what type of a bank was more likely to be a target or an 
acquirer. Looking at the post-merger performance of a consolidated bank, we examine 
the effects of mergers on the cost efficiency, profitability and healthiness. Though many 
preceding studies focus on profitability and cost efficiency, it would be important to 
examine whether bank consolidation improved bank healthiness or not, if regulatory 
authorities promote bank consolidation to stabilize the banking system. We measure 
long-run post-merger performance based on accounting ratios rather than stock market 
returns. Though market returns are relatively free from measurement errors associated 
with accounting ratios, analyzing them would severely reduce the sample size, given that 
many regional banks and all shinkin banks are not publicly traded. In addition, 
accounting ratios enable us to analyze important components of performance (e.g., cost 
efficiency or market power)
2. Finally, our observations are comprehensive. We use data 
                                                  
1  City banks and regional banks are both corporations licensed under Bank Law, while shinkin banks 
are cooperatives of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) licensed under Shinkin Bank Law. 
Regional banks are classified into first-tier and second-tier regional banks according to the 
associations they belong to. There are usually one relatively large first-tier regional bank and some 
relatively small second-tier regional banks in one prefecture.     
2  We could analyze the impact of merger announcement on abnormal returns for the mergers of listed 
major banks (e.g., Okada, 2005). However, it would still be difficult to analyze the long-run   4
of major banks (i.e., city banks, trust banks, and long-term credit banks, which operate 
nation-widely and internationally) and regional banks (i.e., first-tier regional banks and 
second-tier regional banks) over the period of fiscal year 1990-2004, and data of shinkin 
banks over the period of fiscal year 1990-2002. Our sample universe accounts for more 
than 80% share of deposits in all the depository institutions in Japan
3. During the period 
of fiscal year 1990-2004, there were 10 mergers by major banks, 9 mergers by regional 
banks, and 97 mergers and 2 transfers of business among shinkin banks
4, besides the 
mergers and transfer of business from failed banks. 
          The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing 
literature on bank mergers. Section 3 discusses the hypotheses on the motivations of 
bank mergers. Section 4 analyzes the M&A waves in Japan using aggregate data at the 
prefectural level. Section 5 describes our bank-level dataset. Section 6 analyzes the 
motivation of bank mergers using pre-merger bank characteristics data. Section 7 
presents the post-merger performance concerning profitability, market power, cost 
efficiency, healthiness, and portfolio. Section 8 concludes. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
performance of stock returns even for the mergers of listed major banks, because most of the 
consolidated major banking firms newly established holding companies that owned the share of other 
financial institutions (e.g., nonbanks, securities companies, and credit card companies). For the 
pitfalls of using short-run responses of stock market prices to merger announcement when mergers 
are a relatively new phenomenon, see Delong and Deyoung (2007). 
3  As of March 2001, for example, the share of deposits at city banks, first-tier regional banks, 
second-tier regional banks, and shinkin banks are 29.2%, 25.5%, 8.2%, and 15.1%, respectively. Data 
source is Bank of Japan web site: www.boj.or.jp.   
4  No merger was conducted across different types of banks during the sample period, and there was 
one sale of business of a failed bank across bank types: the business of the failed city bank, Hokkaido 
Takushoku Bank, was sold to a regional bank, Hokuyo Bank and a trust bank, Chuo Trust Bank in 
1997.    5
2. Literature review 
In the U.S., a large number of commercial and savings banks were taken over by 
other depository institutions during the 1980s and especially after restrictions on 
intrastate and interstate banking were removed by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Recently, financial conglomerates have emerged 
through a series of M&As after restrictions on securities and insurance businesses by 
banks were lifted by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Service Modernization Act. In 
Europe, the emergence of the European Union in 1999 spurred consolidation of the 
financial services industry. In the crisis-hit Asian countries, foreign capital entry into the 
banking industry and government recapitalization promoted bank consolidation. These 
merger waves generated a vast literature on bank M&As, especially for U.S. and 
European banks. 
Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) review existing research concerning the 
causes and consequences of the consolidation of the financial services industry. They 
point out that the evidence is consistent with increases in market power especially in the 
case of consolidation within the same market (in-market M&As); improvements in profit 
efficiency, and diversification of risks, but little or no cost efficiency improvement on 
average; and potential costs to the financial system from increases in systemic risk or 
expansion of the financial safety net.   
Okada (2005) studied 10 mega-mergers among city banks during 1989-2000 and 
found that no improvement in X-inefficiency was observed but increases in cumulative   6
excess stock returns and decreases in perceived default probability were found. Her 
results suggest that the motivation of mega-mergers was not to improve efficiency but to 
take advantage of the government’s too-big-to-fail policy. Yamori, Harimaya and Kondo 
(2005) studied financial holding companies of regional banks and found that profit 
efficiency tended to increase when the market share in the region increased. Hosono, 
Sakai and Tsuru (2006) analyzed the motives and consequences of credit corporative 
(shinkin) banks during the period of 1984-2002
5. Their major findings are as follows. 
First, less profitable and cost efficient banks were more likely to be an acquirer and a 
target. Second, acquiring banks improved cost efficiency but still deteriorated their 
capital-to-asset ratio after consolidation. Finally, the consolidation of shinkin banks 
tended to improve profitability when the difference in the ex-ante profitability between 
acquiring banks and target banks were large. This paper extends Hosono et al., (2006) to 
cover most Japanese banks, including city banks, first-tier regional banks, second-tier 
regional banks, and shinkin banks. Compared with the preceding studies on the 
consolidation of Japanese banks, this paper comprehensively analyzes the causes and 
consequences of bank mergers, as we mention in the Introduction.   
 
3. Hypotheses on the motives of bank consolidation 
This section reviews four major hypotheses on the motives of bank consolidation.   
 
A.  Improving efficiency 
                                                  
5  See also Yamori and Harimaya (2005) for the study of the mergers of shinkin banks.   7
As Berger et al., (1999) points out, the primary motive for consolidation would be 
maximizing the value of shares owned by existing shareholders. Banks can maximize 
value either by increasing their efficiency or by increasing their market power in setting 
prices. Cost efficiency will be improved if an efficient bank spreads its superior 
managerial skills to an inefficient bank by acquiring the latter. Profitability will be 
enhanced by superior risk management.   
The efficiency improvement hypothesis suggests that an efficient bank tends to 
acquire or purchase the business of an inefficient bank. 
 
B. Strengthening market power 
Market power can be strengthened if two or more banks operating in the same 
market are consolidated and consequently the market becomes more concentrated. 
Existing evidences from the U.S. bank M&As suggest that in-market M&As, i.e., M&As 
of banks operating in the same market, may increase market power in setting prices.   
According to this hypothesis, banks operating in the same region are more likely 
to be consolidated. Actually, most of the M&As among regional banks were conducted 
by banks operating in the same prefecture. Although all of the M&As among corporative 
(shinkin) banks were also conducted by banks operating in the same prefecture, this fact 
does not necessarily imply the market power motive but may simply reflect the 
regulatory restriction under which shinkin banks are allowed to operate only in a region 
that is usually defined within a prefecture.     8
 
C. Taking advantage of a too-big-to-fail policy 
The government policy directly or indirectly affects banks’ M&A decisions. In 
particular, if regulatory authorities are expected to pursue a too-big-to-fail policy, weak 
banks have a strong incentive to be consolidated with each other, because bank managers 
may want to keep their positions. Bank shareholders can also gain from the value of 
deposit insurance by surviving through mergers. 
The government can promote bank consolidations among weak banks in some 
ways. First, the government can “arrange” consolidations, persuading (or sometimes 
forcing) relatively healthy banks to acquire unhealthy banks. Second, the government 
can give weak banks incentives to be consolidated with each other by establishing a 
scheme for recapitalizing consolidated banks. 
In Japan, the government’s “arrangements” were sometimes used before the 1980s 
when the financial markets were heavily regulated, and even in the first half of the 1990s, 
as is known as the “convoy system” (see the next section for details). The 
“market-based” consolidation through public money injection has become an alternative 
tool since 1998 when the banking crisis culminated and the government first 
recapitalized banks. When Japanese authorities recapitalized banks first in 1998, they did 
so towards major banks and two largest regional banks. This fact may have fostered 
banks’ anticipation for bailouts as long as they were large. Not only a large bank that 
operates nation-widely, regional banks and corporative banks (shinkin) banks that are   9
relatively large in a prefecture may have anticipated bailouts, because the Japanese 
regulatory authorities have often worried about the stability of regional financial systems, 
though the notion of a regional systemic risk had not been stipulated until the Deposit 
Insurance Act was revised in 2001 (Article 102)
6 7.  
If the government’s anticipated too-big-to-fail policy and local market stabilization 
policy affect the decision of M&As, unhealthy banks or banks recapitalized by the 
government tend to be consolidated with each other.   
    
D. Managerial Empire Building 
When corporate governance structures are weak, managers may be willing to 
acquire other banks for the purpose of empire-building. They may gain personal 
financial and non-financial gains from consolidated institutions. Managerial hubris 
may also drive bank mergers (Bliss and Rosen, 2001).   
     Weak governance structures allow managers to spend on activities with scope for 
generating managerial private benefits, such as advertisement or entertainment 
expenditures (Yafeh and Yosha, 2003). Therefore, we may expect that banks that spend 
more on advertisement or entertainment tend to acquire other banks. In addition, if 
managerial empire building motive drives M&As, then a consolidated bank cannot 
realize efficiency gains, and is not willing to downsize or restructure the business. 
                                                  
6  For example, when the largest regional bank in Tochigi Prefecture, Ashikaga Bank, was failing, the 
government temporarily nationalized it to avoid a regional systemic risk. 
7  Though the government has not recapitalized shinkin banks so far, this does not necessarily mean 
that the government does not care about the stability of the local financial market. It has not been 
necessary for the government to recapitalize shinkin banks because the central financial institution of 
shinkin banks, called Central Shinkin Bank, recapitalized member shinkin banks when necessary.   10
Managers of consolidated banks may increase advertise expenditures for their private 
benefits.  
  
4.  Bank  Merger  Wave  in  Japan 
4.1 Overview 
A very small number of mergers occurred in the banking industry until the 1980s 
after the World War II in Japan. The number of city banks, which operate nation-widely 
and internationally, had been 13 until 1990
8. Mergers among regional banks, which 
operate mainly within a prefecture, also had been rare until the 1990s. Only one mutual 
bank (former second-tier regional bank) was acquired in the 1970s and two mutual banks 
were acquired in the 1980s.
9 Mergers among credit corporative banks (shinkin) did not 
occur frequently, either. A small number of mergers until the 1980s reflected the 
government’s so-called “convoy system” policy
10. Under this policy, the regulatory 
authorities tried to stabilize the banking system by restricting competition among banks 
and bailing out failing banks. The government restricted banks’ opening new branches 
and prohibited banks from engaging in securities business to control competition. When 
a weak bank fell into financial distress, the government requested a healthy bank to 
rescue the weak bank by injecting capital and sending directors. Healthy banks 
responded to the government’s request because they could obtain the branch networks of 
                                                  
8  Mitsui Bank acquired Taiyo Kobe in 1990. 
9  Hirosaki Sogo Bank was acquired by Seiwa Bank in 1976. Takachiho Sogo Bank was acquired by 
Nishinippon Sogo bank in 1984. Heiwa Sogo Bank was acquired by Sumitomo Bank in 1986. 
10  For the details of the convoy system, see Hoshi and Kashyap (2001). For a typical example, 
Ministry of Finance asked Sumitomo Bank to acquire the failing Heiwa Sogo Bank and Sumitomo 
responded to it so as to obtain the branch network of Heiwa Sogo.   11
the failing banks. Until the 1980s, M&As in the banking industry occurred only when 
the government requested healthy banks to acquire failing banks. 
As the financial liberalization was made progress in the 1980s, the regulatory 
authorities found it more and more difficult to maintain the convoy system; healthy 
banks had little incentive or capability to rescue failing banks. In the early 1990s, stock 
prices and land prices fell sharply, which hit hard banks’ asset quality. Risk-based capital 
requirements based on the Basel capital standards, introduced in fiscal year 1992, 
spurred consolidation of weak banks. Two mergers among city banks
11 and three 
mergers among regional banks occurred in the first half of the 1990s (Table 1). Mergers 
among shinkin banks also occurred more frequently in the 1990s than before. Despite the 
introduction of the Basel capital standards, which were supposed to be rule-based 
regulations, financial regulations and supervisions by Ministry of Finance were still 
affected by political pressure until a banking crisis occurred in 1997
12.  
A banking crisis occurred in 1997, when three large financial institutions, 
including a city bank named Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, failed. In 1998, two long-term 
credit banks named the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank 
failed. In response to the severe banking crisis, the Japanese regulatory authorities 
introduced prompt corrective actions in 1998, applied stringent accounting standards in 
implementing the Basel capital standards, and recapitalized banks to promote their 
                                                  
11  Taiyo Kobe Bank was acquired by Mitsui Bank in 1990 and Saitama Bank was acquired by 
Kyowa Bank in 1991. 
12  The government’s resolutions of the failed “Jusen,” nonblank finance companies specialized in 
housing and real estate loans, were severely criticized by the public that the government rescued 
agricultural cooperatives that had invested in Jusen and had a strong political influence (See Hoshi 
and Kashyap, 2001).   12
restructuring. Financial Supervision Agency (FSA) was built and took over financial 
supervisions from Ministry of Finance in 1998. FSA refrained from “arranging” mergers, 
not intervening in bank mergers to rescue weak banks. 
Major banks tried to survive through mergers, resulting in the merger wave in the 
early 2000s. Financial Rehabilitation Plan, released by Takenaka, Minister of Financial 
Services Agency, in October 2002, forced major banks to apply strict accounting 
standards and to reduce their non-performing loan share to a half, urging weak banks to 
be consolidated.   
Seven mergers among major banks occurred from FY 2000 to FY 2002. Mega 
banks are now reorganized into three groups (Mizuho, Mitsui-Sumitomo, and 
Mitsubishi-UFJ). The government also promoted consolidation of regional banks and 
shinkin banks. New legislation has enabled the government to recapitalize a consolidated 
bank since 2002
13. Six mergers among regional banks occurred from FY 2000 to FY 
2004. Merges among shinkin banks also accelerated in the early 2000s (Table 1).   
 
4.2  Empirical  analysis  
  We first investigate the reasons for the recent merger wave using the M&A ratios, 
i.e., the numbers of M&As divided by the total number of banks existing in the previous 
year, sorted by prefectures and bank types. The hypotheses concerning the motives of 
                                                  
13  Special Measures Law for the Promotion of Financial Institutions Reorganization was enacted in 
October, 2002. Under this law, the government recapitalized Kanto Tsukuba Bank in September 2003. 
Financial Function Reinforcement Law was enacted in April 2004 to enable the government to 
preemptively capitalize healthy regional and shinkin banks. Under this law, Kiyo Holdings and Howa 
Bank were recapitalized in 2006.   13
bank mergers discussed in Section 3 have some implications concerning the time when 
and the space where M&A waves occur. 
  First, if M&As are driven by the motivation for improving efficiency, then merger 
waves result from shocks to an industry’s economic, technological or regulatory 
environment (e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). These shocks lead to industry 
reorganization. Analyzing the U.S. industrial merger waves in the 1980s and the 1990s, 
Harford (2005) found that operational performances measured by ROA, sales growth 
and others, were high prior to merger waves. He also found that higher market valuations 
relaxed financing constraints and made it easier to implement efficiency-driven M&As.
14 
Following Harford (2005), we use the average ROA for each bank type to capture the 
economic shocks to the industry’s operating environment, and the stock price index for 
the banking industry to capture the degree of financial constraints. 
Second, if M&As are driven by the motivation for strengthening market power, 
banks operating in a less concentrated and more competitive market are more willing to 
merge each other. Given that banks often compete within a region
15, we use the 
Herfindahl index for the deposits of regional banks and shinkin banks calculated for each 
prefecture.  
Third, if M&As are driven by the motivation for taking advantage of a 
                                                  
14  Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that stock market overvaluation promotes corporate managers to 
acquire relatively undervalued firms. This “behavioral” hypothesis also suggests that higher share 
prices cause merger waves. However, most of bank mergers in Japan have not been carried out 
through tender offers (take-over-bids) paying with stocks. So, we do not discuss the possibility of the 
behavioral hypothesis in details in this paper. For the empirical evidences of the “neoclassical” and 
“behavioral” hypothesis applied to Japanese non-financial firms, see Arikawa and Miyajima (2007).   
15  For the empirical evidences in Japan, see, e.g., Kano and Tsutsui (2003)   14
too-big-to-fail policy or a local market stabilization policy, then merger waves occur 
when the overall bank health is deteriorated. To capture the bank healthiness, we use the 
average capital-to-asset ratio for each bank type. The change in the stock price index for 
the banking industry also serves as a proxy for bank healthiness. Unlike the 
efficiency-motive hypothesis, the hypothesis concerning a too-big-to-fail policy suggests 
that a lower stock price triggers a bank merger. A low ROA may also lead to a merger 
under the too-big-to-fail-policy hypothesis, because a low ROA deteriorates bank health.   
Finally, if M&As are driven by the managerial motives for private benefits, then 
M&As are more likely to occur when and where the average expenditures for managerial 
private benefits such as advertisement expenditures or entertainment expenditures are 
high. While major banks and regional banks disclose advertisement expenditures, shinkin 
banks do not disclose the components of operational costs such as advertisement 
expenditures. Therefore, we cannot test the managerial motives hypothesis using the 
prefecture-level data here.   
     To control for regional shocks that affect banks’ operating environment, financial 
constraints for M&As, and bank healthiness, we add the growth rate of prefectural GDP 
to the explanatory variables
16. We also include a time dummy that takes the value of 
unity in and after fiscal year 1998 and zero before fiscal year 1997 to capture the 
regulatory changes stated in the previous section. The estimation period is from fiscal 
year 1990 to fiscal year 2004. 
We estimate the following equation. 
                                                  
16  Major banks had head offices in Tokyo, Nagoya, Sapporo or Osaka.   15
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, where indexes i, j, t, are a prefecture, a bank type, and a fiscal year, respectively. 
Average Performance is either the average ROA, the average capital-to-asset ratio 
calculated for each prefecture, or the change in the stock price index for the banking 
industry. We do not enter those three variables at a time, because they are highly 
correlated. Herfindahl Index is calculated based on the shares of deposits of regional and 
shinkin banks in a prefecture. GDP growth is the growth rate of the GDP of the 
prefecture where the head office locates. Because GDP growth is highly correlated with 
stock price index, we do not enter them at the same time. We allow for the change in the 
coefficients of the bank performance variables after the crisis using the interaction term 
of the post-crisis dummy and the performance variables. 
    Table 2 reports the pooled-OLS regression estimates of Equation (1). Though we 
also estimate the model with a fixed or random prefectural effect, we report the 
pooled-OLS model based on the specification tests. First, when the average ROA is 
included as a performance measure (column 1), the coefficients on ROA and its 
interaction term with the post-crisis dummy are both negative, though neither is 
significant. This is not consistent with the efficiency-driven hypothesis. Next, looking at 
the case where the average capital-to-asset ratio is used (column 2), we see that the 
coefficients on the capital-to-asset ratio and its interaction term with the post-crisis   16
dummy are both negative, though only the interaction term is significant. Finally, using 
the stock price index yields the result (column 3) that its coefficient is negative and 
significant, while its interaction term is positive but not significant. These results suggest 
that M&As tended to occur when the overall bank health was deteriorated, consistent 
with the too-big-to-fail or stabilization policy hypothesis. The coefficients on the 
Herfindahl index are negative and significant, regardless of the bank performance 
measures, suggesting that M&As tended to occur where the market was less 
concentrated, which is consistent with the market-power hypothesis. The coefficients on 
the GDP growth are significantly negative, which is again consistent with the 
too-big-to-fail or the financial stabilization policy hypothesis. Finally, the post-crisis 
dummy is positive and significant, suggesting that the regulatory changes triggered bank 
consolidations. 
     We will examine the relevance of the four hypotheses concerning the motives of 
M&As more closely using bank-level data in the following sections.     
 
5. Bank-Level Data   
The data source of financial statements of major banks and regional banks is 
Nikkei Financial Quest and that of shinkin banks is Financial Statements of Shinkin 
Banks in Japan, edited by Financial Book Consultants, Ltd. (Kinyu tosho konsarutanto 
sha). We identify an acquirer if the bank is legally surviving and a target if the bank has 
legally disappeared. We focus on the mergers and acquisitions of surviving banks by   17
excluding from our dataset the transfers of business from a failed bank, because the latter 
is likely to be conducted for different motives and to have different consequences
17. Our 
dataset covers the period of fiscal year 1990 to 2004 (i.e., from March 1991 to March 
2005) for major and regional banks and fiscal year 1990 to 2002 (i.e., from march 1991 
to March 2003) for shinkin banks. For the details of the variables we use, see Appendix 
1. 
In Japan, financial holding companies were allowed to be built since 1998 when 
the Antimonopoly Act was revised. Some consolidated banks, especially major banks 
and large regional banks, took that opportunity to form a financial holding company that 
held insurance companies and nonbank financial companies as well since 2000. In the 
case of holding companies, we use the financial statements of the subsidiary banking 
companies. We do not use the stock prices of the financial holding companies because 
they reflect the performance of the other subsidiary companies as well. By using the 
financial statement of the subsidiary banking companies, we focus on the effects of 
mergers on the banking company. If there is a synergy effect from the security 
companies to the banking company within the same holding company, it is reflected by 
the financial statement of the banking company.   
In the following analyses, we divide the sample banks into major banks (city 
banks, long-term credit banks
18, and trust banks), regional banks (first-tier regional 
                                                  
17  The transfer of business from a failed bank is identified if the deposit insurance made financial 
assistance (not recapitalization) to the bank that acquired or purchased the business of another bank. 
18  Long-term credit banks are those banks that were established for the purpose of long-term 
corporate finance and permitted to issue long-term bonds exclusively under Long-term Credit Bank 
Law. Though three long-term credit banks were established after WWII, two of them (i.e., Long-Term   18
banks and second-tier regional banks), and shinkin banks for the following reasons. First, 
a shinkin bank is a cooperative depository institution specialized to small- and medium- 
sized enterprise (SME) finance. Therefore, the motives and consequences of M&As 
might be different from corporations like major banks and regional banks. Second, while 
major banks operate nation-widely, regional banks and shinkin banks operate mainly 
within a prefecture. Most of the M&As among regional banks and shinkin banks were 
conducted by those banks that operated within the same prefecture (in-market merger)
19. 
The effects of mergers on market power might be different between major banks and 
regional or shinkin banks. Third, regulatory authorities’ attitudes towards the 
non-performing loan problems were different between major banks, on one hand, and 
regional and shinkin banks, on the other hand, in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. The 
government aimed at quickly reducing the non-performing loans of major banks, while 
the government, afraid from the adverse effect of the write-off of non-performing loans 
on SME finance, did not force regional and shinkin banks to reduce non-performing 
loans quickly. Because the number of mergers by major banks and regional banks are 
small (10 and 9, respectively), separating them may yield relatively weak statistical 
results. However, we choose not to pool the major banks and regional banks because of 
the above reasons. 
Table 3 shows the descriptive sample statistics of the bank and market 
                                                                                                                                               
Credit Bank of Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank) failed in 1998, and one (i.e., Industrial Bank of 
Japan) was merged with city banks (Fuji Bank and Daiichi-Kangyo Bank) and reorganized in 2002. 
19  Among the M&As by regional banks or shinkin banks , only four (two M&As by regional and two 
M&As by shinkin banks) were conducted across prefectural borders.   19
characteristics that we use in the following analyses. We compare the bank 
characteristics variables among the acquirers, targets, and the average of each bank type: 
major banks, regional banks, and shinkin banks. The variables of the acquirers and the 
targets are as of one-year before the mergers. Though we do not control for 
macroeconomic shocks across different years in Table 3,
20 it provides some useful 
information concerning the ex-ante characteristics of acquires and targets. First, targets 
and acquirers are less capitalized than the average of each bank type, and the differences 
in the risk-based capital ratios are significant in the case of the mergers of regional banks 
and shinkin banks. Second, the acquirer tends to be larger and the target tends to be 
smaller than the bank-type average, with the exception of the major banks’ targets, 
though the differences in the logarithm of total assets are significant only in the case of 
shinkin banks. Finally, in the case of the M&As of shinkin banks, the targets’ ROA are 
significantly lower than the average.   
Figure 1 compares some characteristics of acquirers and targets as compared with 
the average of each bank type. We follow the following three-step process to draw Figure 
1. First, observing the financial statements of the acquirer and the target for the five 
years preceding the merger, we combine these statements to create pro forma financial 
ratios for a hypothetical combined bank. To calculate hypothetical pre-merger financial 
ratios, we calculate the weighted average of the acquirer and the target, where the total 
                                                  
20  The differences in the interest rates on deposits and loans, in particular, seem to reflect the fact that 
a large number of M&As occurred in the latter half of the 1990s, when Bank of Japan conducted an 
extremely-low-interest-rate policy.   20
assets of the acquirer and the target are used as a weight
21. Second, we calculate the 
post-merger bank’s financial ratios for the actual combined bank using its financial 
statements for five years after the merger. Third, we normalize both the pre-merger and 
post-merger financial ratios of the acquirer and the combined bank, respectively, by 
subtracting off the same-year, bank-type average. 
Those banks whose data is available at the merger year and a pre-merger year are 
included in the sample here. Similarly, those banks whose data is available at the merger 
year and a post-merger year are included in the sample here. In Figure 1, simple averages 
of bank characteristics are depicted. Because we cannot compare accounting variables as 
of the year of M&As with the pre-merger or post-merger periods, we just connect a line 
for one year before M&As and one year after M&As. We look at the financial ratios that 
represent bank efficiency, market power, healthiness, and portfolio. 
     Figure  1A  depicts  the  pre-merger  and post-merger financial ratios of major banks, 
suggesting some interesting facts. First, target banks were less cost-efficient than the 
average and consolidated banks’ ROA recovered slowly from an immediate deterioration 
after mergers. Second, consolidated banks increased the share of SME loans at least for 
the first three years after mergers. Third, the loan interest rate did not show a clear 
increasing tendency. Fourth, poorly capitalized banks tended to be an acquirer or a target, 
and that a consolidated bank suffered from decreasing capital ratios and increasing 
                                                  
21  If three and more banks merged, the series of the targets are a weighted sum of the targets and the 
series of the hypothetical combined bank are a weighted sum of the targets and acquirers. In both 
series, we use total assets as weights.   21
non-performing loans at least for three to four years after mergers
22. Finally, both 
acquirers and targets spent less on advertisement expenses before mergers and 
consolidated banks continued to spend less on them after mergers than the average. 
     Figure  1B  depicts  the  pre-merger  and post-merger bank characteristics of regional 
banks. Like major banks, target banks were inefficient and poorly capitalized and that 
profitability and efficiency once deteriorated and then slowly recovered after 
consolidation. The recovery of bank health, measured by capital ratios or 
non-performing loans, after consolidation was also slow. Unlike major banks, 
consolidated banks decreased the share of loans to SMEs after mergers. Consolidated 
banks also decreased the advertisement expenses after mergers from a relatively high 
level before mergers. 
Figure 1C shows the pre-merger and post-merger bank characteristics of shinkin 
banks. Like major banks and regional banks, target banks were inefficient and unhealthy. 
The recovery of profitability, cost efficiency, or healthiness could not be seen clearly 
after M&As. Acquirers and targets tended to focus on traditional loan business before 
M&As and a consolidated bank tended to focus more on loan business, unlike major 
banks. A consolidated bank raised the loan interest rate after M&As. 
     In the following sections, we statistically examine how the pre-merger bank 
characteristics affected the M&A decision and how M&As changed bank performance.   
                                                  
22  Non-performing loans (NPLs) defined by Bank Law are the sum of loans to failed borrowers, 
delinquent loans, loans delinquent for more than three months, and loans with the terms alleviated, all 
classified by each loan. NPLs defined by Financial Rehabilitation Law are all the claimable assets 
other than the normal ones whose debtors have no financial problems, classified by debtors’ financial 
conditions. Banks are required to disclose both types of NPLs.     22
 
6. Ex-ante Characteristics and the Decision of Consolidation 
    If efficiency improvement motives drive consolidation, relatively profitable and 
efficient banks would tend to acquire relatively unprofitable and inefficient banks in 
order to spread superior expertise and management skills over the target bank. On the 
other hand, if the government’s too-big-to-fail policy or its motives of stabilizing the 
nation-wide or local banking system drive consolidation, relatively unhealthy banks tend 
to be consolidated with each other. The government may also promote consolidations 
through recapitalization. If managerial private incentive for empire-building is a major 
motive for mergers, banks that spend more on private benefits like advertisement 
expenditures are more likely to acquire other banks.   





















  3 , 2 , 1 = j for                      ( 2 )  
, where  j t P,  is the probability of the bank’s choosing the variable  j  at time t, 
with  j  being an acquirer, a target, or neither. The dependent variable vector  j t X , 1 −  
consists of bank profitability, efficiency, healthiness, governmental recapitalization, 
managerial private benefits, and size as well as other control variables including market 
concentration and macroeconomic variables. We choose the ROA and the cost ratio for 
the efficiency variables, and the capital-to-asset ratio and the non-performing loans as a   23
proportion of total loans as bank health measures. Non-performing loans is available 
only after 1998. We also use the yearly change in the stock prices as bank health 
measures in the case of major banks, though the stock price data of individual bank is 
available only up to 2001, because since then major banks established holding 
companies whose subsidiaries include security companies and non-banks as well. The 
governmental recapitalization is captured by a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the bank has been recapitalized that year or before and zero otherwise. As a 
measure of private benefits, we use the advertisement expenses as a proportion of total 
cost. For the size variables, we use the logarithm of total assets and the growth rate of 
total assets. As a degree of market concentration, we use the Herfindahl index for 
regional banks and shinkin banks. Though major banks had head offices in Tokyo, Osaka, 
Nagoya or Sapporo and had some operational advantages over the areas where the head 
offices were located, they had branches and operated nation-widely. This is why we do 
not use the prefectural Herfindahl index in the case of major banks. We control for the 
experience of M&As using a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bank has 
experienced a M&A before and zero otherwise. A bank that has experienced a M&A 
before may not want to carry out another M&A if it takes a long time to consolidate 
information systems and other business cultures. On the other hand, a bank that has 
experienced M&As may have knowledge and skills how to efficiently integrate different 
business practices. In that case, the M&A experience dummy has a positive effect on the 
probability of being an acquirer. Finally, to control for industrial or macroeconomic   24
shocks, we add the change in the stock price index for the banking industry and the 
growth rate of GDP in the case of major banks, and the growth rate of prefectural GDP in 
the case of regional and shinkin banks. All the explanatory variables are lagged by 
one-year. 
We checked the correlation among the explanatory variables and found that ROA 
and the capital-to-asset ratio are strongly correlated for regional banks and shinkin banks 
(The correlation coefficients are 0.045, 0.853, and 0.615 for major banks, regional banks 
and shinkin banks, respectively.) To check the robustness, we also estimate Eq. (2) by 
entering ROA and the capital-to-asset ratio one by one into the explanatory variables. In 
addition, to take into consideration the possibility that it took more than one year to 
prepare for mergers, we also present the estimation results in the case of two-year lagged 
dependent variables
23.  
    We estimate Eq. (2) for each bank type: major banks, regional banks, and 
shinkin banks. In addition to the full sample period (FY 1990-2004), we divide the 
sample period into the pre-crisis period (FY 1990-1997) and the post-crisis (FY 
1998-2004). The regulatory authorities did not intervene in bank mergers to rescue weak 
banks in the post-crisis period. Furthermore, their attitudes toward major banks’ 
non-performing loan problems became much severer in the post-crisis period than in the 
pre-crisis period. It would be useful to see whether there would be difference in the 
                                                  
23  Two-year lagged dependent variables may be appropriate in case that a bank that is to be acquired 
by a relatively healthy bank in two years gambles on high-risk high-return investment and finally 
deteriorates its balance sheet one-year before mergers. This potential moral hazard problem was 
pointed out by Hiro Ito.   25
motives of bank mergers between the pre- and post- crisis periods. 
 
Major banks   
     Table 4A shows the estimation results for major banks. Column 1 shows the 
estimated coefficients and column 2 shows the estimated marginal effects
24 for the full 
sample period. Looking at the results of the acquirer equation, we see that the coefficient 
on the governmental capital injection dummy is positive and significant, suggesting that 
those major banks that had been recapitalized by the government were more likely to be 
consolidated. This result is consistent with the too-big-to-fail policy or stabilization 
policy hypothesis. It should be noted, however, that because all the major banks were 
recapitalized by the government in 1998, the coefficient on the governmental capital 
injection dummy may reflect any structural changes after 1998. The other bank 
characteristics variables and macroeconomic variables are not significant. Turning to the 
target equation, we see that the coefficient on the industrial stock price index is negative 
and significant, suggesting that a bank was more likely to be acquired when the equity 
values of the banking industry were deteriorated. These results are consistent with the 
too-big-to-fail policy or the stabilization policy hypothesis. 
Entering ROA and the capital-to-asset ratio one by one into the explanatory 
variables, we obtain similar results (shown in columns 3 to 6), though the coefficient on 
the governmental capital injection dummy is positive and significant in the target 
equation when only ROA is entered. 
                                                  
24  The average marginal effects are reported here (Wooldridge, 2001, pp.467).   26
Columns 7 and 8 show the results when the changes in individual banks’ stock 
prices are used as a bank health measure. We see that its coefficient is not significant in 
the acquirer or target equation. In the case of major banks, the overall worsening of bank 
heath and the government’s response to a systemic risk may have driven the merger 
waves rather than the individual bank health.   
Using two-year lagged explanatory variables, we see (in columns 9 and 10) that no 
explanatory variable is significant in the acquirer or the target equation, except for the 
capital-to-asset ratio in the target equation that is positive and significant. Though this 
result is not consistent with the too-big-to-fail policy hypothesis, two-year lagged 
dependent variable may not be suitable in the case of the mergers of major banks, 
because every major bank seemed to hasten to choose the bank to consolidate or to be 
consolidated by especially in the  post-crisis  period.    
The sub-period estimation results are presented in columns 11 to 14. While no 
pre-merger variable is significant in the pre-crisis period, the coefficient on the cost ratio 
is positive and significant in the target equation in the post-crisis period. The fact that a 
less cost-efficient major bank tended to be acquired by other banks in the post-crisis 
period is consistent with the efficiency-improving hypothesis. 
 
Regional banks 
 Table 4B shows the estimation results for regional banks. Looking at the full 
sample period estimation result, we see that the coefficients on the governmental capital   27
injection dummy are positive and significant in both the acquirer and target equations, 
which supports the too-big-to-fail policy or stabilization policy hypothesis. In the target 
equation, the coefficient on the (logarithm of) asset is negative and significant, 
suggesting that a smaller regional bank was more likely to be a target. These results hold 
even if we enter ROA and capital-to-asset ratio one by one and if we use two-lagged 
dependent variables (columns 3 to 8). Looking at the sub-sample period estimation 
results (columns 9 to 12), we see that no pre-merger variable is significant in the 
pre-crisis period. On the other hand, in the post-merger period, the coefficient on ROA is 
positive and significant and the coefficient on capital-to-asset ratio is negative and 
significant in the acquirer equation, while none is significant in the target equation. The 
result for the acquirer equation in the post-crisis period is consistent both with the 




  Table 4C displays the estimation results for shinkin banks. We exclude 
advertisement expenses from the explanatory variables because shinkin banks do not 
disclose them. Looking at the full sample period estimation result of the acquirer 
equation (columns (1) and (2)), we see that the coefficients on the (logarithm of) asset 
and the M&A experience dummy are positive and significant. A larger shinkin bank is 
more likely to acquire another shinkin bank. In the target equation, the coefficient on   28
ROA is positive and significant and the coefficient on the cost ratio is negative and 
significant. Efficient shinkin banks tended to be a target, though the efficiency-improving 
hypothesis posits that efficient banks tend to be an acquirer. The coefficient on the 
capital-to-asset ratio is negative and significant, which is consistent with the 
too-big-to-fail or stabilization policy. The coefficient on the Herfindahl index is negative 
and significant, suggesting that a shinkin bank tends to be consolidated if it operates in a 
less concentrated market, which is consistent with the market power hypothesis. The 
coefficients on the (logarithm of) asset and the asset growth are both negative and 
significant, suggesting that a small or slowly growing shinkin bank tended to be a target. 
Most of these results still hold even if we enter ROA and the capital-to-asset ratio 
separately (columns (3)-(6)) or if we use two-year lagged dependent variables (columns 
(7) and (8)), though the coefficients on ROA and the capita-to-asset ratio become 
insignificant in the target equation when we enter them separately. 
Though the sub-sample period estimation results yield similar results both in the 
pre-merger and post-merger periods, it is notable that the coefficient on the 
capital-to-asset ratio is negative and significant in the target equation only in the 
post-crisis period, suggesting that the too-big-to-fail or stabilization policy hypothesis is 
valid in the post-crisis period. The coefficient on the non-performing loan ratio is also 
positive and significant in the target equation in the post-crisis period. The evidences on 
the effects of the pre-merger bank efficiency on the likelihood of being a target are 
mixed; the signs of the coefficients on ROA change from negative in the pre-crisis period   29
to positive in the post-crisis period, and the coefficient on the cost ratio is negative and 
significant in the pre-crisis period. 
  
     In sum, the efficiency-improving hypothesis seems to be valid in the case of the 
post-crisis period’s consolidations among major banks and among regional banks. The 
market power hypothesis seems to be valid in the case of the consolidations among 
shinkin banks. The government’s too-big-to-fail or financial stabilization policy 
hypothesis also seems to be valid especially in the case of the post-crisis period’s 
consolidations. We find no evidence that supports the managerial empire-building 
hypothesis, though we cannot test that hypothesis in the case of the consolidations 
among shinkin banks due to the lack of suitable data. 
 
7. Post-Merger Performance 
7.1 Background 
     Consolidation may have various effects on the consolidated bank’s efficiency, 
market power, services provided, healthiness and expenses for managerial private 
benefits. 
     First, consolidation may increase or decrease efficiency in various ways. A 
consolidated bank may be able to achieve a scale or scope economy. It may also improve 
X-efficiency by spreading superior acquirers’ managerial skills over targets. On the other 
hand, it may take considerable time and costs to integrate different accounting and   30
information systems, ways of doing business, and corporate cultures. 
     Second, consolidation may change the availability of loans and other financial 
services to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), though such changes may not 
be intended either by acquirers or targets. If consolidation improves efficiency, a more 
efficient consolidated bank may be able to serve more customers, including SMEs. On 
the other hand, if a large bank may find it costly to process relationship-based 
information due to its organizational complexity, a consolidated bank may reduce loans 
to the SMEs that are informationally opaque (Berger et al., 1999). Consolidated banks 
may also increase or reduce other services, including fee businesses, according to their 
comparative advantages.   
     Third,  consolidation  may  strengthen  market power, enabling the consolidated bank 
to raise loan interest rates or lower deposit interest rates. This is likely to occur when 
acquires and targets operated within the same local market (e.g., Berger et al., 1999). 
     Fourth,  consolidation  may  improve  or deteriorate healthiness. Although regulators 
may promote consolidations by weak banks, it is not clear whether weak banks can 
restore healthiness just through consolidation. On one hand, a consolidated bank may 
gain from risk diversification through investing various areas and industries (Berger et 
al., 1999). In addition, an acquirer may apply its superior risk management skills to a 
target. However, if poorly-capitalized banks are consolidated, a consolidated bank must 
be highly profitable to fill in the initial shortage of capital and then to recover its capital 
to a normal level, unless it raises capital from outside. In addition, a consolidated bank   31
may be exposed to the risk of an unproportionally large amount of loans to some specific 
large borrowers as compared with other banks as a result of the consolidation.
25 
Finally, consolidation may increase or decrease expenses for the purpose of 
managerial private benefits, like advertisement expenses. If a bank acquires another bank 
for the purpose of increasing private benefits, a consolidated bank may increase expenses 
for private benefits. On the other hand, if a bank becomes a target due to its weak 
governance structures that allow large amounts of spending for private benefits, a 




     We investigate the consequences of M&As by comparing the bank financial 
variables of pre-merger and post-merger periods. From the viewpoint of existing 
shareholders (or members of shinkin banks) of acquirers, it is natural to compare 
pre-merger acquiring banks and post-merger consolidated banks. On the other hand, 
from the viewpoint of regulators that care about the banking system, it is useful to 
compare hypothetical pre-merger combined banks (that is, a weighted average of an 
acquirer and a target) and post-merger consolidated banks. We perform both 
comparisons.  
Specifically, we first construct the financial ratios of the pre-merger hypothetical 
                                                  
25  The following example may be useful. Tokai Bank, Sanwa Bank, Fuji bank and Sumitomo Bank 
each had almost equal amounts (more than 500 billion yens) of loans outstanding to a large retail 
company, Daiei, which was in financial distress. It is said that UFJ Bank, formed from the 
consolidation of Tokai Bank and Sanwa Bank, was saddled with a distinguished amount (more than 
one trillion yens) of loans to Daiei for a long time after the consolidation. 
26  The approach here is similar to Delong and Deyoung (2007).   32
combined bank and the post-merger consolidated bank in the same way as we depicted 
Figure 1. Note that we normalize all the pre-merger and post-merger financial ratios by 
subtracting off the same-year, bank-type average. Next, we take the pre-merger average 
of the hypothetical combined bank over the five years before mergers. If the pre-merger 
data is available for less than five years, we take the pre-merger average over the 
maximum years for which we can observe the data. Finally, we take the difference 
between the normalized pre-merger bank financial ratios and the normalized post-merger 
bank financial ratios. We look at the changes of the bank financial ratios for one to five 
years after mergers, respectively, though we report in Table 5 only three and five years 
after mergers to save space. Focarelli and Panetta (2003), Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005), 
and Rhoades (1998) show that a 2-3 year post-merger period is needed to determine if 
there are any post merger gains. We also take the average of the post-merger financial 
ratios of the consolidated bank over the (at most) five years after mergers and take the 
difference between the pre-merger 5-year average and the post-merger 5-year average. 
We perform the t-test for the null hypothesis that the difference between a 
normalized pre-merger financial ratio and a normalized post-merger financial ratio has 
mean zero. We also performed the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (z-statistic) for the null 
hypothesis that the difference between them has median zero and obtained qualitatively 
similar results for most financial ratios. So, we mainly report the t-test results below. 
In this section, we select a sample where data on bank financial ratios are available 
for the merger year, one or more pre-merger years, and one or more post-merger years.   33
The dataset here is slightly different from that used in Figure 1, where we choose sample 
banks whose data were available for the merger year and one or more pre-merger years 
but not necessarily available for post-merger years and sample banks whose data were 
available for the merger year and one or more post-merger years but not necessarily 




          Table 5A shows the changes in the financial ratios of the consolidated major banks. 
The first column shows the changes from the hypothetical pre-merger combined bank for 
the full sample period. 
Looking at the efficiency variables, we see that the changes in ROA are negative 
three years after mergers and then turned to positive five years after mergers, though 
none of the changes is significant. The changes in the cost ratio are not significant, either, 
though consolidated banks seem to have decreased the cost ratio. It seems to take 
considerable time for a consolidated bank to realize cost savings or gain economies of 
scale or scope. 
Market power variables show that the changes in the average deposit interest rate 
and the changes in the loan interest rate are not significant. A consolidated major bank 
did not seem to be able to exert market power in the deposit or loan market. This is not 
surprising, given that both acquiring major banks and target major banks operated   34
nation-widely. 
Business scope variables suggest that the share of SME loans significantly 
increases three years after mergers. One possible reason is that acquirers may have 
spread its skills necessary to make SME loans to targets. However, more plausible reason 
is that when the government recapitalized banks, it required banks to increase SME loans. 
Because banks tended to be consolidated after the government recapitalization, 
consolidated banks increased SME loans. This result is different from U.S. bank merger 
evidences, especially for the mergers of large banks (Berger et al, 1999, pp.170).  The 
changes in fees and commissions and in the loan-to-asset ratio are not significant. 
Bank health measures suggest that the changes in the capital-to-asset ratios are 
negative and significant three years after mergers and the changes in the risk-based BIS 
capital ratios are also negative and significant (for t-statistics) for three years after 
mergers. The improvement of ROA after the merger was not quick or sufficient enough 
to offset the initial gap of the capital ratios between consolidated banks (i.e., acquirers 
and targets) and their peers. In addition, the changes in the non-performing loan ratios, 
based either on Bank Law or Financial Rehabilitation Act, are positive and significant 3 
years after mergers. Consolidated banks may have applied a stricter standard to 
recognize non-performing loans than before, resulting in the increase in disclosed 
non-performing loans. It is well known that Japanese banks often manipulated the 
amounts of disclosed non-performing loans so that they could satisfy the Basel capital 
standards before the Financial Rehabilitation Plan (i.e., Takenaka Plan) in 2002. In   35
addition, a consolidated bank may have been exposed to the risk of an unproportionally 
large amount of loans to some specific large borrowers as a result of the consolidation. 
When those borrowers fell in financial distress, the consolidated bank may have 
continued to lend to them in order to avoid their failures, which would cause a sharp 
decrease in the bank’s own capital.
27 
Finally, private benefit variables suggest that the change in the advertisement 
expenses as a proportion of total assets is not significant. The consolidated bank did not 
significantly increase advertisement expenses. In addition, the change in the average loan 
growth rate over the post-merger five years is significantly negative. The change in the 
average asset growth rate is also negative, though not significant. These results suggest 
that mergers triggered asset restructuring. Considering these results together, we may say 
that no evidence is found that support the managerial empire building hypothesis. 
     The second and third columns of Table 5A report the changes in the post-merger 
performance from the hypothesized pre-merger combined bank for the sub-periods of the 
pre-crisis period (FY 1990-1997) and the post-crisis period (FY1998-2004), respectively. 
In the pre-merger period, the change in the share of SME loans is significantly positive. 
On the other hand, in the post-merger period, the changes in the loan growth rate, the 
asset growth rate, and the capital ratio are significantly negative and the change in the 
non-performing loan ratio based on the Bank Law is significantly positive. The mergers 
in the post-merger crisis period seem to have been more directed to asset restructuring 
                                                  
27  Such a behavior is called “ever-greening” (Peek and Rosen, 2005) or “zombie lending” (Caballero, 
Hoshi, and Kashyap, 2006).   36
and yet to have resulted in a worse bank health, though the long-run effects of the 
mergers in the early 2000s may not have been realized yet.   
The last column of Table 5A shows the changes of the performance of 
consolidated banks from the pre-merger acquirer’s level for the full sample period. Most 
of the changes from the pre-merger acquirer’s level are qualitatively the same as the 
changes from the pre-merger hypothetical combined bank, except that the changes in the 
share of SME loans is not significant, reflecting the fact that the pre-merger acquirer’s 
share of SME loans was higher than the average of major banks. 
 
Regional banks 
Table 5B shows the changes in the financial ratios of the consolidated regional 
banks. The first column shows the changes from the pre-merger hypothetical combined 
bank for the full sample period. Like major banks, the changes in ROA are negative, 
though not significant, three years after mergers and then turn to be positive and 
significant (for t-statistics) five years after mergers. This increase in ROA is caused 
partly by a strengthened market power of a consolidated bank in the loan market, which 
can be seen by the positive and significant change in the loan interest rate three and five 
years after mergers. Though the increase in the loan interest rate may reflect the change 
in the riskiness of the portfolio, the share of SME loans, which can be considered to be 
relatively risky, tended to decrease, if any, rather than to increase after mergers. 
Furthermore, examining the correlations of the change in the loan interest rate with the   37
Herfindahl Index and with the SME loan share, we find that the former is 0.571, while 
the latter is 0.243. A relatively high correlation between the change in the loan interest 
rate and the Herfindahl Index is consistent with the market power hypothesis. Though 
there is a possibility that consolidated banks implemented more stringent risk 
management, it would be difficult to charge higher loan rates without a strengthened 
market power. The changes in the capital-to-asset ratio are negative up to five years after 
mergers, though significant only the five-year average after mergers. The improvement 
of ROA after the merger was too slow and small to offset the initial gap of the capital 
ratios between consolidated banks and their peers. The advertisement expenses as a 
proportion of total costs decrease significantly three and five years after mergers, which 
is not consistent with the managerial empire building hypothesis. 
Dividing the sample period into the pre-crisis period and the post-crisis period (the 
second and third columns, respectively), we see that the changes in the capital-to-asset 
ratio are negative for both periods but significant only for the post-crisis period, while 
the change in the fees and commissions is positive and significant in the post-crisis 
period (for the z-statistics).   
The last column shows the changes of the performance of a consolidated bank 
from the pre-merger acquirer for the full sample period. The changes from the 
pre-merger acquirer are qualitatively the same as the changes from the pre-merger 
hypothetical combined bank except for the change in the advertisement expenses from 
the pre-merger acquirer, which is negative but not significant.   38
 
Shinkin  banks   
        Table 5C shows the changes in the financial ratios of the consolidated shinkin banks 
for the full sample period. The first column shows the changes from the hypothetical 
pre-merger combined bank.  Some financial ratios change in similar ways to those of 
major and regional banks. First, the changes in ROA are negative   three years after 
mergers and then turn to positive, though not significant. Second, the changes in the loan 
interest rate are positive, though not significant. The correlation of the change in the loan 
interest with the change in the Herfindahl Index is positive (0.356) and significant, 
suggesting that the increase in the loan interest rate, if any, may be caused by a 
strengthened market power. Third, the capital-to-asset ratio and the risk-based capital 
ratio (BIS) are both negative and significant for most of the post-merger years. Fourth, 
the changes in the asset growth rate are negative and significant five years after mergers.   
The second and third columns show the results for the pre-crisis and post-crisis 
periods, respectively. The changes in the capita-to-asset ratios and the asset growth rate 
are negative and significant in both periods, while the change in the risk-based capital 
ratio is negative in both periods but significant only in the post-crisis period. 
 The last column shows the changes in the financial ratios of a consolidated bank 
from the pre-merger acquirer. The changes in the capita-to-asset ratio, the risk-based 
capital ratio and the asset growth rate are similar to the changes from the hypothetical 
combined bank, while the changes in the loan growth rates are negative and significant   39
up to five years after M&As and the change in the non-performing loan ratio is positive 
and significant for the five-year post-merger average. 
 
        We may summarize the post-merger performance of consolidated banks as follows. 
First, consolidated banks tended to go through a decline in ROA at first and then to 
increase ROA about five years after mergers, though this recovery was significant only 
for the mergers of regional banks. It seems to take considerable time and costs to 
integrate different information systems and other business methods. Second, in the case 
of the M&As by regional banks or shinkin banks, consolidated banks tended to raise 
interest rates on loans, though this is significant only for the mergers by regional banks, 
suggesting that their market power was strengthened within the prefecture they operated 
in. This is consistent with the U.S. evidence, showing that in-market consolidation 
strengthens market power. Third, the changes in services provided are different by bank 
type and by period. Consolidated major banks tended to expand SME loans in the 
pre-crisis period, while consolidated regional banks tended to expand fees and 
commissions business in the post-crisis period. Fourth, consolidated banks did not 
recover bank health after mergers. The capital-to-asset ratio tended to decrease rather 
than to increase regardless of bank type. The recovery of ROA was too slow and small to 
fill in the initial gap of the capita-asset-ratio between consolidated banks and their peers. 
In addition, consolidated banks did not decrease non-performing loans. Finally, 
consolidated banks tended to decelerate the loan growth rate and the asset growth rate,   40
suggesting that consolidated banks tried to restructure assets and to downsize. 
Consolidated banks did not increase the advertisement expenses. Managerial empire 
building hypothesis does not seem to be valid in Japan.   
   
8. Conclusion 
The recent waves of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the banking industries 
across the world raise important questions of whether mergers enhance the efficiency of 
consolidated banks and contribute to the stabilization of the banking sector. We 
investigate the motives and consequences of the consolidation of banks in Japan during 
the period of fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 2004. In particular, we test the four 
hypotheses concerning the motives for bank mergers: efficiency improving, 
strengthening market power, taking advantage of a too-big-to-fail policy, and managerial 
empire building. 
We first investigated the reasons for the recent merger wave using the aggregate 
data at the prefecture-level. Our results suggest that M&As tended to occur when the 
overall bank health was deteriorated and where the market was less concentrated. These 
results are consistent with the too-big-to-fail or stabilization policy hypothesis and the 
market power hypothesis, respectively. 
Our analysis concerning the relationship between ex-ante bank characteristics and 
the decision of M&As suggests as follows. First, in the post-crisis period (1998-2004), 
efficient banks tended to acquire an inefficient bank except for the M&As of corporative   41
(shinkin) banks. This finding is consistent with the efficiency-improving hypothesis. 
Second, unhealthy banks tended to be consolidated with each other especially in the 
post-crisis period, which is consistent with the too-big-to-fail policy or stabilization 
policy hypothesis.   
  Our investigation of post-merger performance suggests as follows. First, 
consolidated banks tended to go through a decline in ROA at first and then to increase 
ROA about five years after mergers, though these changes are not necessarily significant. 
Second, in-market consolidation enabled consolidated banks to raise the loan interest 
rate. Third, consolidated banks tended to decrease the capital-to-asset ratio and not to 
decrease non-performing loans. Finally, consolidated banks tended to restrain loan and 
asset growths and not to increase advertisement expenses.   
In sum, our analysis suggests that the government’s too-big-to-fail policy or its  
attempt at stabilizing the local financial market through consolidations played an 
important role in the M&As, though its attempt does not seem to have been successful. 
The efficiency-improving motive also seems to have driven the M&As conducted by 
major banks and regional banks in the post-crisis period, while the market-power motive 
seems to have driven the M&As conducted by regional banks and corporative (shinkin) 
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Table 1. Number of Banks and Number of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) 
1990 22 1 0 132 0 0 451 3 0
1991 21 1 0 132 1 0 440 3 0
1992 21 0 0 130 1 1 (1) 435 4 0
1993 21 0 0 129 1 0 428 5 0
1994 21 0 0 129 0 0 421 8 0
1995 21 0 0 129 0 1 (1) 416 4 0
1996 20 1 0 128 0 0 410 5 1
1997 19 0 1 (1) 126 0 1 (1) 401 8 0
1998 19 0 0 124 0 3 (3) 396 3 0
1999 19 0 0 123 0 1 (1) 386 5 (1) 1 (1)
2000 18 1 0 119 1 1 (1) 371 7 (2) 9 (8)
2001 15 3 0 117 0 0 349 11 (2) 5 (5)
2002 13 3 0 116 0 0 326 15 6 (6)
2003 13 0 0 110 2 0 306 14 0
2004 13 0 0 107 3 0 298 7 0















1.  Major banks include city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks. Regional banks include first-tier regional banks and second-tier regional banks. 
2.  The numbers in the parentheses denote the numbers of mergers or acquisitions of the business of a failed bank. 
3.  No merger was implemented across bank type during the sample period, and one sales of business of a failed bank was conducted across bank types (in the case of the failure of 
a major bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in 1997).   
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Post-Crisis Dummy*Capital-to-Asset Ratio -0.450 ***
(0.122)
Industrial Stock Price -0.008 **
(0.004)
Post-Crisis Dummy*Industrial Stock Price 0.008
(0.015)
Herfindahl Index -1.625 ** -1.509 ** -2.077 ***
(0.736) (0.740) (0.735)
GDP Growth -0.099 ** -0.109 ***
(0.040) (0.040)
Post-Crisis Dummy 0.840 *** 3.214 *** 1.377 ***
(0.324) (0.641) (0.365)
Cons 1.665 *** 1.668 *** 1.421 ***
(0.362) (0.453) (0.313)
Number of Observations 1,963 1,963 1,963




1.  The dependent variable is the numbers of M&As divided by the total number of banks. 
2.  Pooled OLS regression results are reported. 
3.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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ROA -0.32 -0.36 -0.27 -0.19 0.00 0.13 -0.06 -0.17 0.23 0.06 0.11 -0.27 0.19 -0.01 -0.37 ***
(1.08) (0.79) (1.13) (0.85) (0.65) (0.37) (0.49) (2.16) (0.31) (0.17) (0.47) (0.96) (1.03) (0.44) (0.89)
Cost Ratio 0.85 0.95 0.86 0.01 0.12 1.43 1.48 1.45 0.03 0.07 1.61 1.69 1.64 -0.01 0.07
(0.35) (0.66) (0.41) (0.32) (0.64) (0.25) (0.17) (0.26) (0.22) (0.16) (0.20) (0.36) (0.24) (0.20) (0.36)
Fees and Commissions 0.26 0.29 0.26 -0.01 0.01 0.25 0.20 0.19 0.03 -0.02 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.00
(0.13) (0.26) (0.16) (0.13) (0.26) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Loan-to-Asset Ratio 56.60 57.83 56.12 1.38 2.29 70.85 71.82 69.33 2.44 3.36 61.29 57.77 58.84 3.17 *** -0.19
(6.50) (6.62) (8.81) (7.53) (8.57) (5.28) (4.43) (7.03) (5.15) (4.93) (6.95) (10.26) (8.53) (6.55) (10.27)
Loans to SMEs 28.53 24.22 27.84 2.07 -1.89 47.98 52.13 47.96 2.73 6.34
(7.68) (6.12) (7.75) (6.84) (7.49) (8.11) (6.43) (9.52) (7.24) (7.75)
Loan Growth Rate 5.99 0.08 2.32 0.11 -5.34 9.48 -0.41 2.81 7.57 -2.36 2.12 -2.35 4.09 -0.38 -4.46 ***
(10.03) (9.31) (18.58) (12.39) (8.97) (23.32) (5.33) (8.01) (23.15) (3.91) (5.72) (5.78) (8.72) (3.93) (4.86)
Deposit Interest Rate 2.29 1.87 3.04 -0.23 -0.13 1.49 1.79 1.75 -0.06 0.07 1.39 1.25 1.91 0.00 0.02
(2.08) (2.01) (2.26) (0.54) (0.92) (2.08) (2.28) (1.67) (0.11) (0.23) (1.47) (1.47) (1.57) (0.18) (0.13)
Loan Interest Rate 3.47 3.14 3.96 -0.06 0.03 3.85 4.51 4.05 -0.04 0.43 *** 4.24 4.08 4.78 0.01 0.02
(2.19) (1.87) (2.06) (0.27) (0.42) (2.22) (2.16) (1.76) (0.38) (0.24) (1.57) (1.60) (1.64) (0.34) (0.49)
Capital-to-Asset Ratio 3.75 4.02 3.95 -0.46 -0.19 3.27 3.11 3.67 -0.73 -0.81 4.92 4.11 5.34 -0.51 *** -1.34 ***
(1.37) (1.57) (1.47) (1.02) (1.19) (0.68) (1.36) (3.19) (0.96) (1.09) (1.44) (1.99) (2.16) (1.45) (2.03)
Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) 10.31 10.55 11.50 -1.36 -0.89 7.30 6.15 8.77 -1.72 ** -2.86 ** 8.86 7.18 9.65 -1.12 ** -2.98 ***
(1.70) (1.55) (2.58) (1.37) (1.54) (1.31) (1.70) (3.80) (1.27) (1.76) (3.15) (3.44) (4.11) (2.87) (3.45)
Non-Performing Loan Ratio (BL) 8.72 8.99 10.32 -1.46 -1.74 9.40 9.59 7.15 1.56 1.74 9.69 14.15 7.81 0.50 4.67 ***
(4.46) (6.72) (7.87) (3.66) (7.13) (3.03) (2.62) (5.15) (2.63) (2.06) (6.42) (6.69) (5.75) (4.98) (6.05)
Non-Performing Loan Ratio (FRL) 8.92 9.17 9.77 -1.40 -1.75 9.48 10.33 8.01 1.71 2.40
(4.53) (6.80) (6.79) (3.71) (7.25) (3.19) (3.56) (4.93) (2.98) (2.95)
Advertisement Expenses  1.76 1.47 1.91 0.00 -0.19 1.68 1.99 1.60 0.21 0.50
(0.93) (0.77) (1.07) (1.02) (0.76) (0.90) (0.94) (0.65) (0.90) (1.00)
Stock Price -17.58 -22.60 -10.77 -4.28 6.83
(16.15) (10.61) (28.79) (15.49) (10.61)
Ln Asset 17.03 16.87 16.85 0.18 0.00 14.27 13.67 14.19 0.04 -0.54 19.38 18.20 18.82 0.49 *** -0.70 ***
(0.84) (1.15) (0.96) (0.82) (1.13) (0.56) (0.74) (0.89) (0.54) (0.71) (0.86) (0.93) (0.97) (0.84) (0.89)
Asset Growth Rate 9.57 -0.60 1.35 3.02 -5.32 9.17 1.99 2.30 7.71 0.64 2.63 -0.68 4.06 -0.62 -3.84 ***
(10.63) (10.63) (17.57) (6.86) (9.80) (21.63) (4.55) (8.82) (21.21) (4.84) (4.37) (8.88) (8.17) (3.32) (8.35)
Number of Observations 8 11 286 9 8 1,876 64 80 5,928
Major Banks Regional Banks Shinkin Banks
 
Notes 
1.  *** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively, for the null hypothesis that the difference has zero mean.   49
2.  “Acquirer-All” and “Target-All” are calculated for each M&A and only for the years when there are at least one M&A, while “All” is a simple average over the whole sample 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Acquirer
ROA -0.200 -0.0000 -0.267 -0.0000 0.284 0.0000 17.817 0.0000 0.079 0.0001
(0.470) (0.342)  (0.843)  (19.158) (0.900) 
Cost Ratio 3.157 0.0028 2.451 0.0000 3.138 0.0000 0.433 -0.0046 1.734 0.0020 1.907 0.0000 5.054 0.0155
(2.207) (2.073) (2.201) (2.475) (2.065) (4.665) (2.820) 
Capital-to-Asset Ratio -0.421 -0.0003 -0.478 -0.0000 0.313 0.0004 -4.355 -0.0727 -0.954 -0.0323
(0.426) (0.416) (0.369)  (3.079)  (0.716) 
Advertisement Expenses 0.218 0.0000 0.129 0.0000 0.195 0.0000 0.092 0.0052 -0.275 -0.0000 -0.505 -0.0000 2.062 0.0030
(0.497) (0.500) (0.499) (0.524) (0.539) (0.880) (1.179) 
Ln Asset 1.255 0.0437 1.284 0.0437 1.178 0.0072 0.766 0.0043 0.937 0.0026 -0.200 0.0024 2.015 0.0641
(0.936) (0.918) (0.916) (1.025) (0.909) (1.561) (1.607) 
Asset Growth 0.017 0.0000 0.018 0.0000 0.017 0.0000 0.024 0.0000 0.019 0.0000 -0.001 -0.0000 0.011 0.0000
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.044) (0.021) 
Industrial Stock Price -0.031 -0.0000 -0.038 -0.0000 -0.028 -0.0000 0.019 0.0000 0.747 0.0000 -0.150 -0.0018
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032)  (0.031) (0.595) (0.096) 
GDP Growth 0.527 0.0000 0.455 0.0000 0.508 0.0000 0.578 0.0000 5.310 -0.0011 0.189 0.0002
(0.279) (0.266) (0.274)  (0.324) (4.326) (0.793) 
M&A Experience -2.783 -0.0506 -2.402 -0.0435 -2.729 -0.0499 -1.768 -0.0311 -1.941 -0.0345 -3.447 -0.1163
(1.600) (1.479) (1.589) (1.537) (1.390)  (1.977) 
Governmental Capital 2.987 ** 0.1209 2.247 ** 0.0745 3.076 ** 0.1271 1.685 0.0650 2.617 0.1054
(1.338) (1.024) (1.349) (0.894) (1.353) 
Stock Price -0.005 -0.0000
(0.016) 
Non-performing Loan Ratio -0.019 0.0024
(0.269) 
Cons -28.848 -29.828 -27.195 -17.567 -23.765 -5.595 -42.340
(18.148) (17.845) (17.645) (19.683) (17.740) (30.763) (31.100) 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Target
ROA -0.082 -0.0000 -0.092 -0.0000 0.001 0.0000 7.495 0.0000 0.323 -0.0001
(0.401) (0.366) (0.284) (9.127) (0.915)
Cost Ratio 2.134 0.0010 2.110 0.0000 2.119 0.0000 6.011 0.0574 1.821 0.0039 -1.494 -0.0000 7.484 ** 0.3149
(1.637) (1.626) (1.629) (4.998) (1.640) (3.793) (3.292)
Capital-to-Asset Ratio -0.051 0.0001 -0.075 0.0000 0.613 ** 0.0090 -2.184 -0.0272 0.209 0.0153
(0.355) (0.334) (0.305) (1.778) (0.702)
Advertisement Expenses -0.286 -0.0000 -0.294 -0.0000 -0.297 -0.0000 -11.020 -0.0692 -0.645 -0.0000 -0.545 -0.0000 0.344 -0.0024
(0.519) (0.516) (0.515) (6.692) (0.527) (0.641) (0.970)
Ln Asset 0.868 0.0082 0.895 0.0103 0.832 0.0116 3.524 0.0282 1.195 0.0596 -1.689 -0.0288 1.513 0.0518
(0.792) (0.762) (0.769) (3.155) (0.789) (1.586) (1.718)
Asset Growth -0.028 -0.0000 -0.028 -0.0000 -0.029 -0.0000 0.094 0.0000 0.001 0.0000 0.018 0.0000 -0.055 -0.0000
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.071) (0.022) (0.054) (0.064)
Industrial Stock Price -0.083 ** 0.0000 -0.084 ** -0.0000 -0.083 -0.0000 -0.021 -0.0000 0.458 0.0000 -0.427 -0.0203
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.027) (0.383) (0.315)
GDP Growth 0.499 0.0000 0.493 0.0000 0.495 0.0000 0.351 0.0000 3.305 0.0064 1.204 0.0039
(0.282) (0.277) (0.284) (0.242) (2.837) (1.870)
M&A Experience -1.164 -0.0290 -1.146 -0.0292 -1.142 -0.0287 -2.962 -0.0275 -1.283 -0.0337 -1.744 -0.0495
(0.972) (0.965) (0.967) (3.029) (0.978) (1.359)
Governmental Capital 1.792 0.0576 1.721 ** 0.0610 1.838 0.0586 2.525 0.0178 1.011 0.0281
(1.010) (0.844) (0.986) (3.004) (0.930)
Stock Price -0.035 -0.0000
(0.055)
Non-performing Loan Ratio -0.399 -0.0090
(0.281)
Cons -21.920 -22.526 -21.181 -60.254 -27.602 23.337 -42.943
(15.593) (14.882) (15.110) (54.140) (15.501) (29.490) (34.366)
Number of Observations 279 280 279 225 279 170 90
Pseudo R-sq 0.168 0.162 0.167 0.272 0.166 0.277 0.446
Log Likelihood -68.457 -69.027 -68.547 -34.234 -68.641 -21.780 -25.370
1998-2004 1990-2004 1990-2001 1990-2004 1990-1997
Notes 
1.  The probability of being an acquirer or a target as compared with being neither of them is estimated using the maximum-likelihood estimator. 
2.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
3.  *** and ** represent significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
4.    Independent variables are lagged one year for columns (1)-(8) and (11)-(14), while they are lagged two years for columns (9) and (10).   52



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Acquirer
ROA 0.321 0.0000 0.258 0.0000 -0.086 -0.0000 1.231 0.0000 5.329 *** 0.0000
(0.171) (0.227)  (0.394) (4.907) (1.724) 
Cost Ratio -0.643 -0.0000 -0.308 -0.0000 -0.567 -0.0000 0.276 0.0000 0.258 0.0000 3.284 0.0063
(2.184) (2.218) (2.116) (2.346) (4.026) (3.314) 
Capital-to-Asset Ratio -0.173 -0.0000 -0.043 -0.0000 0.063 0.0000 -0.663 -0.0000 -1.622 *** -0.0000
(0.103)  (0.077) (0.300) (1.065) (0.575) 
Advertisement Expenses 0.219 0.0000 0.212 0.0000 0.224 0.0000 -0.018 -0.0000 0.042 0.0000 -0.028 -0.0000
(0.459) (0.441) (0.446) (0.577) (1.091) (0.421) 
Ln Asset -0.145 0.0001 -0.110 0.0001 -0.143 0.0001 -0.045 0.0001 0.161 0.0000 1.190 0.0037
(0.631) (0.639) (0.615) (0.680) (1.259) (1.083) 
Asset Growth 0.017 0.0000 0.018 0.0000 0.018 0.0000 -0.048 -0.0000 0.033 0.0000 0.001 0.0000
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.072) (0.050) (0.016) 
Herfindahl Index 0.480 0.0000 0.170 0.0000 0.216 0.0000 -0.066 -0.0000 5.948 0.0000 -1.046 -0.0000
(2.195) (2.175) (2.161) (2.165) (4.042) (3.063) 
GDP Growth 0.016 0.0000 0.022 0.0000 0.022 0.0000 0.085 0.0000 -0.007 -0.0000 -0.052 -0.0000
(0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.115) (0.157) (0.235) 
Governmental Capital 2.125 ** 0.0257 2.106 ** 0.0258 1.983 ** 0.0227 1.965 ** 0.0221 1.080 0.0112
(0.894) (0.891) (0.878) (0.874)  (1.082) 
Non-Performing Loan Ratio 0.201 0.0000
(0.180) 
Cons -2.570 -4.073 -3.089 -5.609 -9.029 -21.882
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Target
ROA 0.279 0.0000 0.095 0.0000 -0.145 -0.0000 1.892 0.0000 2.221 0.0000
(0.226) (0.385) (0.376) (2.142) (1.491)
Cost Ratio -3.315 -0.0000 -3.083 -0.0000 -3.227 0.0000 -1.951 -0.0000 -2.785 -0.0000 -4.467 -0.0053
(2.242) (2.256) (2.167) (2.006) (3.671) (4.473)
Capital-to-Asset Ratio -0.177 -0.0000 -0.057 -0.0000 0.123 0.0000 -1.708 -0.0021 -0.543 -0.0000
(0.117) (0.084) (0.300) (0.969) (0.517)
Advertisement Expenses 0.441 0.0000 0.457 0.0000 0.459 0.0000 0.454 0.0000 -0.440 -0.0000 0.674 0.0000
(0.396) (0.379) (0.388) (0.439) (1.241) (0.480)
Ln Asset -1.497 ** -0.0028 -1.482 ** -0.0029 -1.484 ** -0.0028 -1.317 ** -0.0032 -1.732 -0.0021 -1.435 -0.0069
(0.625) (0.621) (0.613) (0.622) (1.347) (0.991)
Asset Growth -0.017 -0.0000 -0.022 -0.0000 -0.014 -0.0000 -0.093 -0.0000 0.013 0.0000 -0.073 -0.0000
(0.060) (0.072) (0.061) (0.060) (0.099) (0.125)
Herfindahl Index -1.399 -0.0000 -1.725 -0.0000 -1.547 -0.0000 -1.725 -0.0000 -0.435 -0.0000 1.334 0.0000
(2.227) (2.195) (2.203) (2.288) (3.479) (4.129)
GDP Growth 0.006 0.0000 0.019 0.0000 0.014 0.0000 0.114 0.0000 -0.051 -0.0000 0.083 0.0000
(0.115) (0.119) (0.115) (0.109) (0.167) (0.306)
Governmental Capital 2.511 *** 0.0324 2.418 *** 0.0300 2.405 *** 0.0297 2.442 *** 0.0297 1.643 0.0133
(0.929) (0.920) (0.906) (0.914) (1.311)
Non-Performing Loan Ratio 0.245 0.0001
(0.209)
Cons 20.334 19.234 19.589 14.645 28.199 19.328
(11.402) (11.261) (11.057) (11.030) (23.502) (18.866)
Number of Observations 1,869 1,869 1,869 1,866 1,039 628
Pseudo R-sq 0.100 0.089 0.088 0.092 0.130 0.308




See the notes to Table 4A.   





   54



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Acquirer
ROA 0.113 0.0000 0.050 0.0000 0.089 0.0000 -0.447 0.0000 0.072 0.0000
(0.151) (0.115) (0.159) (1.528) (0.238)
Cost Ratio 0.397 0.0000 0.504 0.0000 0.443 0.0000 0.571 0.0000 0.859 0.0000 0.036 0.0000
(0.655) (0.631) (0.648) (0.640) (0.856) (1.076)
Capital-to-Asset Ratio -0.055 -0.0000 -0.014 -0.0000 -0.039 -0.0000 -0.143 -0.0000 0.051 0.0000
(0.083) (0.055) (0.085) (0.168) (0.110)
Ln Asset 0.521 *** 0.0000 0.546 *** 0.0000 0.534 *** 0.0000 0.573 ** 0.0000 0.541 ** 0.0000 0.536 ** 0.0071
(0.168) (0.165) (0.167) (0.166) (0.215) (0.274)
Asset Growth -0.029 -0.0000 -0.029 -0.0000 -0.025 -0.0000 -0.016 -0.0000 -0.021 -0.0000 -0.033 -0.0000
(0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.034) (0.028)
Herfindahl Index 0.495 0.0000 0.441 0.0000 0.439 0.0000 0.451 0.0000 0.746 0.0000 -0.138 -0.0000
(0.789) (0.785) (0.786) (0.784) (1.082) (1.209)
GDP Growth -0.021 -0.0000 -0.018 -0.0000 -0.019 -0.0000 0.007 0.0000 0.006 0.0000 -0.149 -0.0000
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.031) (0.038) (0.093)
M&A Experience 0.989 *** 0.0161 1.030 *** 0.0171 0.998 *** 0.0164 1.009 *** 0.0163 1.280 *** 0.0268
(0.334) (0.328) (0.334) (0.332) (0.422)
Non-Performing Loan Ratio 0.061 0.0000
(0.035)
Cons -14.915 *** -15.837 *** -15.422 *** -16.361 *** -15.626 *** -15.662 **
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Target
ROA 0.445 *** 0.0000 0.079 0.0000 0.505 *** 0.0000 -3.783 *** -0.0000 0.549 *** 0.0000
(0.110) (0.055) (0.122) (1.336) (0.132)
Cost Ratio -1.167 *** -0.0002 -1.265 *** -0.0001 -1.356 *** -0.0001 -1.111 *** 0.0000 -1.398 ** -0.0000 -0.943 -0.0008
(0.416) (0.437) (0.437) (0.403) (0.590) (0.694)
Capital-to-Asset Ratio -0.284 *** -0.0000 -0.043 -0.0000 -0.304 *** -0.0000 -0.087 -0.0000 -0.236 ** -0.0000
(0.072) (0.040) (0.073) (0.136) (0.093)
Ln Asset -0.955 *** -0.0014 -0.876 *** -0.0012 -0.944 *** -0.0013 -0.868 *** -0.0010 -1.157 *** -0.0011 -0.911 *** -0.0170
(0.141) (0.137) (0.138) (0.136) (0.216) (0.212)
Asset Growth -0.129 *** -0.0000 -0.141 *** -0.0000 -0.098 *** -0.0000 -0.121 *** -0.0000 -0.037 -0.0000 -0.158 *** -0.0000
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.031) (0.046)
Herfindahl Index -2.588 *** -0.0003 -2.701 *** -0.0000 -2.890 *** -0.0000 -2.450 *** -0.0000 -2.426 ** -0.0000 -3.663 *** -0.0000
(0.753) (0.756) (0.753) (0.736) (1.180) (1.105)
GDP Growth -0.066 -0.0000 -0.048 -0.0000 -0.065 -0.0000 -0.004 -0.0000 -0.054 -0.0000 -0.052 -0.0000
(0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.036) (0.057) (0.088)
M&A Experience -0.369 -0.0042 -0.166 -0.0022 -0.398 -0.0045 -0.369 -0.0043 -0.282 -0.0051
(0.663) (0.641) (0.721) (0.622) (0.666)
Non-Performing Loan Ratio 0.112 *** 0.0000
(0.028)
Cons 17.821 *** 15.151 *** 16.835 *** 16.125 *** 21.240 *** 15.637 ***
(2.971) (2.926) (2.972) (2.865) (4.288) (4.763)
Number of Observations 5,626 5,626 5,626 5,758 3,432 2,167
Pseudo R-sq 0.098 0.087 0.086 0.085 0.098 0.158




See the notes to Table 4A. 
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Table 5A. Post-Merger Performance of Major Banks 
Change from:
ROA
ΔROA (3-year post-merger) -0.200 -0.212
ΔROA (5-year post-merger) 0.149 0.125
ΔROA (post-merger average) -0.219 0.150 -0.377 -0.230
Cost Ratio
ΔCost Ratio (3-year post-merger) -0.015 -0.054
ΔCost Ratio (5-year post-merger) -0.058 -0.124
ΔCost Ratio (post-merger average) -0.018 0.015 -0.033 -0.058
Fees and Commissions
ΔFees and Commissions (3-year post-merger) 0.079 -0.032
ΔFees and Commissions (5-year post-merger) 0.110 0.048
ΔFees and Commissions (post-merger average) 0.006 0.065 -0.024 -0.029
Loan-to-Asset Ratio
ΔLoan-to-Asset Ratio (3-year post-merger) -0.235 -0.398
ΔLoan-to-Asset Ratio (5-year post-merger) 2.498 1.817
ΔLoan-to-Asset Ratio (post-merger average) -1.037 0.580 -1.730 -1.200
Loans to SMEs
ΔLoans to SMEs (3-year post-merger) 1.700 b -1.850
ΔLoans to SMEs (5-year post-merger) -0.384 -4.909
ΔLoans to SMEs (post-merger average) 1.727 b** 1.064 b 2.390 -2.047
Loan Growth Rate
ΔLoan Growth Rate (3-year post-merger) -2.760 -3.784
ΔLoan Growth Rate (5-year post-merger) -4.478 -6.387
ΔLoan Growth Rate (post-merger average) -3.058 b** 0.014 -4.375 a** -4.082 b**
Deposit Interest Rate
ΔDeposit Interest Rate (3-year post-merger) 0.008 0.114
ΔDeposit Interest Rate (5-year post-merger) -0.354 -0.249
ΔDeposit Interest Rate (post-merger average) -0.058 0.023 -0.093 0.048
Loan Interest Rate
ΔLoan Interest Rate (3-year post-merger) 0.062 0.075
ΔLoan Interest Rate (5-year post-merger) -0.057 -0.010
ΔLoan Interest Rate (post-merger average) -0.001 0.167 -0.073 0.012
Capital-to-Asset Ratio
ΔCapital-to-Asset Ratio (3-year post-merger) -1.319 a** -1.342 a**
ΔCapital-to-Asset Ratio (5-year post-merger) -0.509 -0.498
ΔCapital-to-Asset Ratio (post-merger average) -1.158 a*** -0.432 -1.470 a** -1.181 a***
Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS)
ΔRisk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) (3-year post-merger) -2.108 b -1.788 b
ΔRisk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) (5-year post-merger)
ΔRisk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) (post-merger average) -1.376 -1.376 -1.104
Non-Performing Loan Ratio (BL)
ΔNon-Performing Loan Ratio (BL) (3-year post-merger) 4.118 b 4.301 a**
ΔNon-Performing Loan Ratio (BL) (5-year post-merger)
ΔNon-Performing Loan Ratio (BL) (post-merger average) 3.697 b 3.697 b 3.880 b**
Non-Performing Loan Ratio (FRL)
ΔNon-Performing Loan Ratio (FRL) (3-year post-merger) 3.589 b 3.835 b**
ΔNon-Performing Loan Ratio (FRL) (5-year post-merger)
ΔNon-Performing Loan Ratio (FRL) (post-merger average) 3.202 3.202 3.448 b**
Advertisement Expenses
ΔAdvertisement Expenses (3-year post-merger) -0.268 -0.339
ΔAdvertisement Expenses (5-year post-merger) 0.243 0.038
ΔAdvertisement Expenses (post-merger average) -0.164 0.240 -0.337 -0.234
Asset Growth
ΔAsset Growth (3-year post-merger) -3.450 -4.497
ΔAsset Growth (5-year post-merger) -3.891 -5.557







1.  The columns under the heading of “Pre-Merger Combined Bank” denote the average change from the 
pre-merger hypothetical combined bank that is a weighted average of an acquirer and a target. 
2.  The column under the heading of “Pre-Merger Acquirer” denotes the average changes from the pre-merger 
acquirer.  
3.  ΔX (t-year post-merger) is the difference of the variable X between t-year post-merger and the pre-merger   57
average over five years (or less if data is not available).   
4.  ΔX (post-merger average) is the difference between X(post-merger average) and X(pre-merger average), where 
X(post-merger average) is the post-merger average of the variable X over five years (or less if data is not 
available) and X(pre-merger average) is the pre-merger average of the variable X over five years (or less if data 
not available). 
5.  a and b denote significance at the 1% and 5 % level, respectively, for the null hypothesis that ΔX (or X) has zero 
mean. 
6.  *** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5 % level, respectively, for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the 
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Table 5B. Post-Merger Performance of Regional Banks 
ROA
ΔROA (3-year post-merger) -1.869 -1.934
ΔROA (5-year post-merger) 0.504 b 0.481 b
ΔROA (post-merger average) -0.471 0.067 -0.793 -0.530
Cost Ratio
ΔCost Ratio (3-year post-merger) -0.003 0.021
ΔCost Ratio (5-year post-merger) -0.084 -0.045
ΔCost Ratio (post-merger average) 0.009 -0.064 0.053 0.021
Fees and Commissions
ΔFees and Commissions (3-year post-merger) 0.013 -0.001
ΔFees and Commissions (5-year post-merger) -0.003 -0.010
ΔFees and Commissions (post-merger average) 0.034 -0.005 0.057 ** 0.014
Loan-to-Asset Ratio
ΔLoan-to-Asset Ratio (3-year post-merger) -2.131 -0.623
ΔLoan-to-Asset Ratio (5-year post-merger) -3.387 -2.100
ΔLoan-to-Asset Ratio (post-merger average) -2.163 -2.299 -2.082 -1.303
Loans to SMEs
ΔLoans to SMEs (3-year post-merger) -1.556 -1.079
ΔLoans to SMEs (5-year post-merger) -1.320 -0.721
ΔLoans to SMEs (post-merger average) -0.335 -1.310 0.249 0.415
Loan Growth Rate
ΔLoan Growth Rate (3-year post-merger) -3.471 -3.587
ΔLoan Growth Rate (5-year post-merger) -1.928 -2.549
ΔLoan Growth Rate (post-merger average) -0.846 -0.974 -0.768 -0.818
Deposit Interest Rate
ΔDeposit Interest Rate (3-year post-merger) -0.010 0.015
ΔDeposit Interest Rate (5-year post-merger) 0.125 0.143
ΔDeposit Interest Rate (post-merger average) -0.006 0.025 -0.024 0.023
Loan Interest Rate
ΔLoan Interest Rate (3-year post-merger) 0.187 b 0.269
ΔLoan Interest Rate (5-year post-merger) 0.177 b 0.221
ΔLoan Interest Rate (post-merger average) 0.069 0.174 0.007 0.178 b**
Capital-to-Asset Ratio
ΔCapital-to-Asset Ratio (3-year post-merger) -0.371 -0.416
ΔCapital-to-Asset Ratio (5-year post-merger) -0.202 -0.283
ΔCapital-to-Asset Ratio (post-merger average) -0.892 b** -0.135 -1.347 a** -0.995 b**
Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS)
ΔRisk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) (3-year post-merger)
ΔRisk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) (5-year post-merger)
ΔRisk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) (post-merger average) -0.543 -0.543 -0.718
Non-Performing Loan Ratio (BL)
ΔNon-Performing Loan Ratio (BL) (3-year post-merger)
ΔNon-Performing Loan Ratio (BL) (5-year post-merger)
ΔNon-Performing Loan Ratio (BL) (post-merger average) 0.813 0.813 0.870
Non-Performing Loan Ratio (FRL)
ΔNon-Performing Loan Ratio (FRL) (3-year post-merger)
ΔNon-Performing Loan Ratio (FRL) (5-year post-merger)
ΔNon-Performing Loan Ratio (FRL) (post-merger average 1.478 1.478 0.560
Advertisement Expenses
ΔAdvertisement Expenses (3-year post-merger) -0.353 a -0.300
ΔAdvertisement Expenses (5-year post-merger) -0.251 b -0.154
ΔAdvertisement Expenses (post-merger average) -0.052 -0.203 0.038 0.064
Asset Growth
ΔAsset Growth (3-year post-merger) -2.223 -2.018
ΔAsset Growth (5-year post-merger) -1.652 -2.126
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Table 5C. Post-Merger Performance of Shinkin Banks 
ROA
ΔROA (3-year post-merger) -0.032 -0.047
ΔROA (5-year post-merger) 0.107 0.093
ΔROA (post-merger average) 0.003 0.064 -0.098 -0.019
Cost Ratio
ΔCost Ratio (3-year post-merger) -0.002 -0.011
ΔCost Ratio (5-year post-merger) 0.011 -0.014
ΔCost Ratio (post-merger average) 0.000 0.018 -0.029 0.000
Fees and Commissions
ΔFees and Commissions (3-year post-merger) 0.004 0.003
ΔFees and Commissions (5-year post-merger) 0.007 0.005
ΔFees and Commissions (post-merger average) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Loan-to-Asset Ratio
ΔLoan-to-Asset Ratio (3-year post-merger) 0.718 -0.120
ΔLoan-to-Asset Ratio (5-year post-merger) 1.127 0.186
ΔLoan-to-Asset Ratio (post-merger average) 0.765 0.328 1.492 0.178
Loan Growth Rate
ΔLoan Growth Rate (3-year post-merger) -0.916 -1.833 a***
ΔLoan Growth Rate (5-year post-merger) -0.971 -2.029 b**
ΔLoan Growth Rate (post-merger average) -0.823 -0.744 -0.956 -1.940 a***
Deposit Interest Rate
ΔDeposit Interest Rate (3-year post-merger) 0.037 0.052
ΔDeposit Interest Rate (5-year post-merger) 0.039 0.064
ΔDeposit Interest Rate (post-merger average) 0.022 0.049 -0.021 0.029
Loan Interest Rate
ΔLoan Interest Rate (3-year post-merger) 0.084 0.052
ΔLoan Interest Rate (5-year post-merger) 0.088 0.045
ΔLoan Interest Rate (post-merger average) 0.062 0.079 0.033 0.040
Capital-to-Asset Ratio
ΔCapital-to-Asset Ratio (3-year post-merger) -0.547 b** -0.659 a***
ΔCapital-to-Asset Ratio (5-year post-merger) -0.476 -0.551
ΔCapital-to-Asset Ratio (post-merger average) -0.510 a*** -0.487 b** -0.548 a*** -0.625 a***
Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS)
ΔRisk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) (3-year post-merger) -1.508 -1.801 b**
ΔRisk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) (5-year post-merger) -3.331 b -3.354 b
ΔRisk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS) (post-merger average) -0.969 a*** -1.820 -0.733 a*** -1.311 a***
Non-Performing Loan Ratio (BL)
ΔNon-Performing Loan Ratio (BL) (3-year post-merger) 0.697 1.565
ΔNon-Performing Loan Ratio (BL) (5-year post-merger) 0.842 1.338
ΔNon-Performing Loan Ratio (BL) (post-merger average) 0.625 0.094 0.782 1.426 b**
Asset Growth
ΔAsset Growth (3-year post-merger) -1.070 -1.358 b**
ΔAsset Growth (5-year post-merger) -1.844 b** -2.011 a**
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Figure 1A. Pre-Merger and Post-Merger Performances of Major Banks 
ROA Cost Ratio
Fees and Commissions Loan-to-Asset Ratio
Loans to SMEs Loan Growth Rate
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(Figure 1A. Continued from previous page) 
Advertisement Expenses Asset Growth
Capital-to-Asset Ratio Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS)


















































































1.  Period zero designates the year when the bank merger occurred. Negative periods denote pre-merger years and 
positive periods denote post-merger years. 
2.  We connect the period (-1) value and period (+1) value with a straight line. 
3.  Weighted average denotes the hypothetical pre-merger combined bank, calculated as a weighted average of the 
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Figure 1B. Pre-Merger and Post-Merger Performances of Regional Banks 
 
ROA Cost Ratio
Fees and Commissions Loan-to-Asset Ratio
Loans to SMEs Loan Growth Rate
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(Figure 1B. Continued from previous page) 
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Figure 1C. Pre-Merger and Post-Merger Performances of Shinkin Banks 
ROA Cost Ratio
Fees and Commissions Loan-to-Asset Ratio
Loan Growth Rate
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(Figure 1C. Continued from previous page) 
Risk-Based Capital Ratio (BIS)
Asset Growth


























































See the notes to Figure 1A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 